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By realizing a quantum cryptography system based on po-
larization entangled photon pairs we establish highly secure
keys, because a single photon source is approximated and
the inherent randomness of quantum measurements is ex-
ploited. We implement a novel key distribution scheme us-
ing Wigner’s inequality to test the security of the quantum
channel, and, alternatively, realize a variant of the BB84 pro-
tocol. Our system has two completely independent users sep-
arated by 360 m, and generates raw keys at rates of 400 –
800 bits/second with bit error rates arround 3%.
The primary task of cryptography is to enable two par-
ties (commonly called Alice and Bob) to mask confiden-
tial messages such, that the transmitted data are illegible
to any unauthorized third party (called Eve). Usually
this is done using shared secret keys. However, in prin-
ciple it is always possible to intercept classical key dis-
tribution unnoticedly. The recent development of quan-
tum key distribution1 can cover this major loophole of
classical cryptography. It allows Alice and Bob to estab-
lish two completely secure keys by transmitting single
quanta (qubits) along a quantum channel. The underly-
ing principle of quantum key distribution is that nature
prohibits to gain information on the state of a quantum
system without disturbing it. Therefore, in appropriately
designed schemes, no tapping of the qubits is possible
without showing up to Alice and Bob. These secure keys
can be used in a One-Time-Pad protocol2, which makes
the entire communication absolutely secure.
Two well known concepts for quantum key distribu-
tion are the BB84 scheme and the Ekert scheme. The
BB84 scheme1 uses single photons transmitted from Al-
ice to Bob, which are prepared at random in four partly
orthogonal polarization states: 0◦, 45◦, 90◦, 135◦. If Eve
tries to extract information about the polarization of the
photons she will inevitably introduce errors, which Alice
and Bob can detect by comparing a random subset of the
generated keys.
The Ekert scheme3 is based on entangled pairs and uses
Bell’s inequality4 to establish security. Both Alice and
Bob receive one particle out of an entangled pair. They
perform measurements along at least three different di-
rections on each side, where measurements along parallel
axes are used for key generation and oblique angles are
used for testing the inequality. In3, Ekert pointed out
that eavesdropping inevitably affects the entanglement
between the two constituents of a pair and therefore re-
duces the degree of violation of Bell’s inequality. While
we are not aware of a general proof that the violation
of a Bell inequality implies the security of the system,
this has been shown5 for the BB84 protocol adapted to
entangled pairs and the CHSH inequality6.
In any real cryptography system, the raw key gener-
ated by Alice and Bob contains errors, which have to
be corrected by classical error correction7 over a public
channel. Furthermore it has been shown that whenever
Alice and Bob share a sufficiently secure key, they can en-
hance its security by privacy amplification techniques8,
which allow them to distill a key of a desired security
level.
A range of experiments have demonstrated the feasi-
bility of quantum key distribution, including realizations
using the polarization of photons9 or the phase of pho-
tons in long interferometers10. These experiments have a
common problem: the sources of the photons are attenu-
ated laser pulses which have a non-vanishing probability
to contain two or more photons, leaving such systems
prone to the so called beam splitter attack11.
Using photon pairs as produced by parametric down-
conversion allows us to approximate a conditional single
photon source12 with a very low probability for generat-
ing two pairs simultaneously and a high bit rate13. More-
over, when utilizing entangled photon pairs one immedi-
ately profits from the inherent randomness of quantum
mechanical observations leading to purely random keys.
Various experiments with entangled photon pairs have
already demonstrated that entanglement can be pre-
served over distances as large as 10 km14, yet none of
these experiments was a full quantum cryptography sys-
tem. We present in this paper a complete implementation
of quantum cryptography with two users, separated and
independent of each other in terms of Einstein locality
and exploiting the features of entangled photon pairs for
generating highly secure keys.
In the following we will describe the variants of the
Ekert scheme and of the BB84 scheme which we both
implemented in our experiment, based on polarization
entangled photon pairs in the singlet state
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
[|H〉A|V 〉B − |V 〉A|H〉B] , (1)
where photon A is sent to Alice and photon B is sent
to Bob, and H and V denote the horizontal and vertical
linear polarization respectively. This state shows perfect
anticorrelation for polarization measurements along par-
allel but arbitrary axes. However, the actual outcome
of an individual measurement on each photon is inher-
ently random. These perfect anticorrelations can be used
for generating the keys, yet the security of the quan-
tum channel remains to be ascertained by implementing
a suitable procedure.
Our first scheme utilizes Wigner’s inequality15 for es-
tablishing the security of the quantum channel, in anal-
ogy to the Ekert scheme which uses the CHSH inequality.
Here Alice chooses between two polarization measure-
ments along the axes χ and ψ, with the possible results
+1 and −1, on photon A and Bob between measurements
along ψ and ω on photon B. Polarization parallel to the
analyzer axis corresponds to a +1 result, and polarization
orthogonal to the analyzer axis corresponds to −1.
Assuming that the photons carry preassigned values
determining the outcomes of the measurements χ, ψ, ω
and also assuming perfect anticorrelations for measure-
ments along parallel axes, it follows, that the probabil-
ities for obtaining +1 on both sides, p++, must obey
Wigner’s inequality:
p++(χ, ψ) + p++(ψ, ω)− p++(χ, ω) ≥ 0 . (2)
The quantum mechanical prediction pqm++ for these
probabilities at arbitrary analyzer settings α (Alice) and
β (Bob) measuring the Ψ− state is
pqm++(α, β) =
1
2
sin2 (α− β) . (3)
The analyzer settings χ = −30◦, ψ = 0◦, and ω = 30◦
lead to a maximum violation of Wigner’s inequality (2):
pqm++(−30◦, 0◦) + pqm++(0◦, 30◦)− pqm++(−30◦, 30◦) =
= 1
8
+ 1
8
− 3
8
= − 1
8
≥ 0 . (4)
As Wigner’s inequality is derived assuming perfect an-
ticorrelations, which are only approximately realized in
any practical situation, one should be cautious in ap-
plying it to test the security of a cryptography scheme.
When the deviation from perfect anticorrelations is sub-
stantial, Wigner’s inequality has to be replaced by an
adapted version16.
In order to implement quantum key distribution, Alice
and Bob each vary their analyzers randomly between two
settings, Alice: −30◦, 0◦ and Bob: 0◦, 30◦ (Figure 1a).
Because Alice and Bob operate independently, four possi-
ble combinations of analyzer settings will occur, of which
the three oblique settings allow a test of Wigner’s in-
equality and the remaining combination of parallel set-
tings (Alice= 0◦ and Bob= 0◦) allows the generation of
keys via the perfect anticorrelations, where either Alice
or Bob has to invert all bits of the key to obtain identical
keys.
If the measured probabilities violate Wigner’s inequal-
ity, then the security of the quantum channel is ascer-
tained, and the generated keys can readily be used. This
scheme is an improvement on the Ekert scheme which
uses the CHSH inequality and requires three settings of
Alice’s and Bob’s analyzers for testing the inequality and
generating the keys. From the resulting nine combina-
tions of settings, four are taken for testing the inequality,
two are used for building the keys and three are omitted
at all. However in our scheme each user only needs two
analyzer settings and the detected photons are used more
efficiently, thus allowing a significantly simplified experi-
mental implementation of the quantum key distribution.
As a second quantum cryptography scheme we imple-
mented a variant of the BB84 protocol with entangled
photons, as proposed in Reference17. In this case, Al-
ice and Bob randomly vary their analysis directions be-
tween 0◦ and 45◦ (Figure 1b). Alice and Bob observe
perfect anticorrelations of their measurements whenever
they happen to have parallel oriented polarizers, lead-
ing to bitwise complementary keys. Alice and Bob ob-
tain identical keys if one of them inverts all bits of the
key. Polarization entangled photon pairs offer a means to
approximate a single photon situation. Whenever Alice
makes a measurement on photon A, photon B is pro-
jected into the orthogonal state which is then analyzed
by Bob, or vice versa. After collecting the keys, Alice
and Bob authenticate their keys by openly comparing a
small subset of their keys and evaluating the bit error
rate.
The experimental realization of our quantum key dis-
tribution system is sketched in Figure 2. Type-II para-
metric down-conversion in β-barium borate18 (BBO),
pumped with an argon-ion laser working at a wavelength
of 351 nm and a power of 350 mW, leads to the produc-
tion of polarization entangled photon pairs at a wave-
length of 702 nm. The photons are each coupled into
500 m long optical fibers and transmitted to Alice and
Bob respectively, who are separated by 360 m.
Alice and Bob both have Wollaston polarizing beam
splitters as polarization analyzers. We will associate
a detection of parallel polarization (+1) with the key
bit 1 and orthogonal detection (−1) with the key bit
0. Electro-optic modulators in front of the analyzers
rapidly switch (rise time < 15 ns, minimum switching
interval 100 ns) the axis of the analyzer between two de-
sired orientations, controlled by quantum random signal
generators19. These quantum random signal generators
are based on the quantum mechanical process of split-
ting a beam of photons and have a correlation time of
less than 100 ns.
The photons are detected in silicon avalanche photo
diodes20. Time interval analyzers on local personal com-
puters register all detection events as time stamps to-
gether with the setting of the analyzers and the detection
result. A measurement run is initiated by a pulse from a
separate laser diode sent from the source to Alice and Bob
via a second optical fiber. Only after a measurement run
2
is completed, Alice and Bob compare their lists of detec-
tions to extract the coincidences. In order to record the
detection events very accurately, the time bases in Alice’s
and Bob’s time interval analyzers are controlled by two
rubidium oscillators. The stability of each time base is
better than 1 ns for one minute. The maximal duration
of a measurement is limited by the amount of memory in
the personal computers (typically one minute).
Overall our system has a measured total coincidence
rate of ∼ 1700s−1 , and a singles rate of ∼ 35000s−1
. From this, one can estimate the overall detection ef-
ficiency of each photon path to be 5 % and the pair
production rate to be 7 · 105s−1. Our system is very
immune against a beam splitter attack because the ratio
of two-pair events is only ∼ 3 · 10−3, where a two-pair
event is the emission of two pairs within the coincidence
window of 4 ns. The coincidence window in our exper-
iment is limited by the time resolution of our detectors
and electronics, but in principle it could be reduced to
the coherence time of the photons, which is usually of the
order of picoseconds.
In realizing the quantum key distribution based on
Wigner’s inequality, Alice’s analyzer switch randomly
with equal frequency between −30◦ and 0◦, and Bob’s
analyzer between 0◦ and 30◦. After a measurement, Alice
and Bob extract the coincidences for the combinations of
settings of (−30◦, 30◦), (−30◦, 0◦) and (0◦, 30◦), and cal-
culate each probability. E.g. the probability p++(0
◦, 30◦)
is calculated from the numbers of coincident events C++,
C+−, C−+, C−− measured for this combination of set-
tings by
p++(0
◦, 30◦) =
C++
C++ + C+− + C−+ + C−−
. (5)
We observed in our experiment that the left hand side
of inequality (2) evaluated to −0.112± 0.014. This vio-
lation of (2) is in good agreement with the prediction of
quantum mechanics and ensures the security of the key
distribution. Hence the coincident detections obtained
at the parallel settings (0◦, 0◦), which occur in a quar-
ter of all events, can be used as keys. In the experiment
Alice and Bob established 2162 bits raw keys at a rate
of 420 bits/second21, and observed a quantum bit error
rate of 3.4 %.
In our realization of the BB84 scheme, Alice’s and
Bob’s analyzers both switch randomly between 0◦ and
45◦. After a measurement run, Alice and Bob extract the
coincidences measured with parallel analyzers, (0◦, 0◦)
and (45◦, 45◦), which occur in half of the cases, and gen-
erate the raw keys. Alice and Bob collected ∼ 80000 bits
of key at a rate of 850 bits/second, and observed a quan-
tum bit error rate of 2.5 %, which ensures the security of
the quantum channel.
For correcting the remaining errors while maintaining
the secrecy of the key, various classical error correction
and privacy amplification schemes have been developed7.
We implemented a simple error reduction scheme requir-
ing only little communication between Alice and Bob.
Alice and Bob arrange their keys in blocks of n bits and
evaluate the bit parity of the blocks (a single bit indicat-
ing an odd or even number of ones in the block). The par-
ities are compared in public, and the blocks with agree-
ing parities are kept after discarding one bit per block22.
Since parity checks only reveal odd occurrences of bit
errors, a fraction of errors remains. The optimal block
length n is determined by a compromise between key
losses and remaining bit errors. For a bit error rate p the
probability for k wrong bits in a block of n bits is given
by the binomial distribution Pn(k) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1 − p)n−k.
Neglecting terms for three or more errors and account-
ing for the loss of one bit per agreeing parity, this algo-
rithm has an efficiency η(n) = (1 − Pn(1))(n − 1)/n,
defined as the ratio between the key sizes after par-
ity check and before. Finally, under the same approx-
imation as above, the remaining bit error rate p′ is
p′ = (1 − Pn(0) − Pn(1))(2/n). Our key has a bit er-
ror rate p = 2.5 %, for which η(n) is maximized at n = 8
with η(8) = 0.7284, resulting in p′ = 0.40 %. Hence, from
∼ 80000 bits of raw key with a quantum bit error rate of
2.5 %, Alice and Bob use 10 % of the key for checking
the security and the remaining 90 % of the key to distill
49984 bits of error corrected key with a bit error rate of
0.4%. Finally, Alice transmits a 43200 bit large image to
Bob via the One-Time-Pad protocol, utilizing a bitwise
XOR combination of message and key data (Figure 3).
In this letter we presented the first full implementation
of entangled state quantum cryptography. All the equip-
ment of the source and of Alice and Bob has proven to op-
erate outside shielded lab-environments with a very high
reliability. While further practical and theoretical inves-
tigations are still necessary, we believe that this work
demonstrates that entanglement based cryptography can
be tomorrow’s technology.
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FIG. 1. Settings for Alice’s and Bob’s analyzers for real-
izing quantum key distribution based either on (a) Wigner’s
inequality or (b) the BB84 protocol. The angular coordinates
are referenced to the propagation direction of the particle.
FIG. 2. The polarization entangled photons are transmit-
ted via optical fibers to Alice and Bob, who are separated by
360 m, and both photons are analyzed, detected and regis-
tered independently. After a measurement run the keys are
established by Alice and Bob through classical communica-
tion over a standard computer network.
FIG. 3. The 49984 bit large keys generated by the BB84
scheme are used to securely transmit an image23 (a) of the
“Venus von Willendorf”24 effigy. Alice encrypts the image
via bitwise XOR operation with her key and transmits the
encrypted image (b) to Bob via the computer network. Bob
decrypts the image with his key, resulting in (c) which shows
only few errors due to the remaining bit errors in the keys.
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